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In this paper we assess the record of different post reform governments in meeting their 
targets and improving both delivery and finances. A variety of indices are constructed, and 
consistency checks devised to measure relative performance. No government has achieved its 
targets, but the congress has the best record in keeping its promises, and the NDA was most 
effective in reducing deficits. In the last year of the UPA the deadline effect helped meet 
expenditure  targets,  but  at  the  cost  of  large  deficits.  The  negative  effect  of  the  growth 
dividend  on  government  debt  and  deficits  is  established,  but  the  failure  of  government 
finances to improve commensurate with this, suggests further improvement in expenditure 
management is required. Four principles on which to base these improvements are identified. 
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1 Some of these ideas were presented as a panelist at The IMC viewpoint hour, on ―Is the rising fiscal deficit a 
cause for concern?‖, 31
st July, 2009. I thank Kiran Nanda for the invitation and participants for feedback and 
discussions, and Reshma Aguiar for assistance.  
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This is a good time to assess the evolving fiscal capability of Indian governments. The UPA‘s 
term in office has been completed and can now be evaluated, by itself and relatively to other 
post-reform governments. Second, the past year has been a testing time for government‘s 
around the world, as fiscal policy had to respond to severe demand shocks. Early commentary 
had been very negative about India‘s prospects in the crisis because of ―poor fiscal capacity‖. 
High Indian debt was thought to reduce space for fiscal stimuli, and the government‘s record 
in  executing  expenditure  was  poor.  The  Government,  however,  went  ahead  with  a  fiscal 
stimulus that raised the fiscal deficit by 3.5 percent of GDP. It was able to spend more and 
helped limit the fall in growth to 2 percent. Indian growth rates remained a respectable 7 
percent. Even so, the effectiveness of this stimulus, and the sustainability of government debt 
need to be examined.  
 
Third, the reform period has seen some measures to strengthen institutional capability and 
governance. How far has this impacted the fiscal space? A premier reform measure here was 
the passing of fiscal responsibility legislation in 2003. We examine if an assessment made 
then was fair: ―Although the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Bill 
does  require  mid-term  accountability  to  Parliament,  it  may  turn  out  to  be  a  superficial 
compliance, unless deeper changes occur (Goyal 2004)‖. The FRBM itself may have been 
flawed, but many institutions of governance have been strengthened. More information is 
available  now  on  the  government‘s  website  as  part  of  the  movement  towards  increased 
transparency. The outcome budget, introduced since 2005-06, makes it possible to check the 
results of government schemes and spending.  The RTI Act, valuable in itself, is slowly 
morphing  into  a  more  robust  right  to  publish.  The  legislature  has  become  active  in 
simplifying and modernizing India‘s laws. Have these translated into some improvement in 
governance and fiscal capability? 
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In this paper we assess the record of different post reform governments in meeting their 
targets and improving both delivery and finances. A variety of indices are constructed to 
measure relative performance. A growth dividend is established for government debt and 
deficits, but the failure of government finances to improve commensurate with this, suggests 
further improvement in expenditure management is required. Four principles on which to 
base these improvements are identified.      
 
Assessing Implementation  
The  Government  gets  very  bad  press.  From  R.K.  Laxman  to  more  sober  commentators 
politicians and bureaucrats are regarded as making tall promises that are seldom kept. Table 1 
shows  there  are  still  grounds  for  this  belief.  It  gives  an  index  of  each  post  reform 
government‘s success in spending what it had promised (PM-PK, column 2), its record in 
increasing the growth of expenditure or promises made over the years (PMI, column 3), and 
its success in compressing the fiscal deficit over its term (column 4). 
 
Table: 1 










FD change in 
term (%) 
Congress  1991-92 to 95-96  -0.7  -0.05  -10.8 
UF  1996-97 to 97-98  -8.7  1.21  5.2 
NDA  1998-99 to 03-04  -1.5  -0.57  -21.3 
UPA  2004-05 to 08-09  -1.1 (-1.8)  -0.13 (-0.74)  29.2 (-35.4) 
Note: Bracketed terms exclude the crisis year 2008-09 for the UPA 
Source: Calculated from budget papers available at http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/ 
 
The steps in calculating the PM-PK index are as follows. Calculate first, promises made as 
the rise in the budget estimates in any year as a percentage of revised estimates
2 in the past 
year for each expenditure category. Second, promises kept as rise in the revised estimates of 
that year over the last year‘s revised estimates. Third, the difference between promises kept 
and promises made for each category in each year. Fourth, the total, the standard deviation, 
and the coefficient of variation over all the expenditure categories, for each year. Finally, the 
average of the coefficient of variation over the years each government was in power gives the 
                                                            
2 Actual outlays are also reported after a two-year gap. But these are not available for the early nineties or for 
disaggregated plan expenditures so we use revised estimates as the base.    4 
index. The expenditure categories taken are the Central Plan Outlays (CPO), its financing, 
and allocation over a number of sectors (see Table 2).   
 
In a similar fashion, an index of increase in promises made is calculated. This shows the 
increase in promises made in one year compared to the last. As above the totals normalized 
by the standard deviation are averaged to get the index. 
 
Table 2: Credibility of the UPA Government 
 









Promises  made  kept  made  kept  made  kept  made  kept  made  kept  made  made 





res. of PSEs 
 
10.0  -0.9  47.7  43.6  25.2  20.0  40.2  22.0  36.1  28.0  12.7  13.12 
Budget 














66.5  32.7  43.6  14.5  40.4  10.5  9.7  -1.7  -9.5  -19.2  19.6  19.62 
Energy  10.8  3.1  33.6  23.3  29.5  28.1  15.0  4.9  29.9  36.9  15.8  16.89 
Industry and 
minerals  45.2  36.2  53.2  28.5  44.4  25.1  62.3  42.6  60.6  51.5  24.4  31.43 
Transport  18.2  1.4  61.1  53.5  20.3  23.3  43.7  38.4  22.1  13.5  10.2  20.49 
Communicati









14.9  26.6  35.6  30.2  23.5  15.4  35.8  27.1  27.6  19.3  5.1  15.79 
Source: Calculated from budget papers available at http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/ 
 
Finally, the table also reports a statistic of each government‘s record with the fiscal deficit. It 
gives the change in the FD in the last year of a government‘s tenure compared to what it was 
in the first year of the tenure, as a percentage of the first year value. 
   5 
PM-PK was always negative. No government was able to live upto its promises. The best 
performance was that of the Congress government, and the worst by the United Front. The 
UPA‘s record would be worse than the NDA‘s without counting the crisis year. The focused 
effort to spend in 2008-09 reduced the negative value of the UPA‘s index to –1.1 from –1.8. 
This is the deadline effect, suggesting it is possible to counter bureaucratic inertia and to 
achieve targets. 
 
Table  2,  with  details  of  the  UPA‘s  yearly  targets  and  achievement  for  the  different 
expenditure categories, shows the best delivery was in agriculture and rural development. 
There were severe shortfalls in energy, irrigation, and also, surprisingly, in social services.  
CPOs and budgetary support for the plan were below target for every year except the last, 
while internal and extra budgetary support estimated for public sector enterprises (PSEs) was 
never achieved. The table also shows a sharp increase in the promises made by the UPA II 
over the rather modest promises the UPA had made in the interim budget. Since the initial 
fiscal stimulus relied on tax cuts, expenditure increase was modest. 
 
Table  3  shows  a  steady  increase  in  the  share  of  the  four  categories  of  agriculture  plus 
(agriculture, rural development and irrigation) and social services as a percentage of industry 
plus  (industry  and  minerals,  energy,  transport,  communication,  science,  technology  and 
environment) across all post reform governments. But the rise has been sharpest with the 
UPA, especially considering the expenditure push visible in the revised estimates of the crisis 
year  2008-09,  and  is  to  be  continued  by  the  new  UPA  II  government.  The  UPA  was, 
however, unable to raise the share of agriculture plus until the big push in its last year. The 
new  government  plans  to  continue  this  higher  allocation,  so  agriculture‘s  share  in  plan 
outlays will now be near its share in GDP. The rise in social services implies an effective 
redistribution from earning sectors to those left out of the new opportunities available. The 
UPA‘s goal is inclusive growth. There was progress on the goal of inclusion but although 
they realize growth is essential to provide the revenues for redistribution, the severe shortfalls 
in expenditure on irrigation, on energy and in the central plan outlays implies they neglected 
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Table 3:  Relative sectoral allocations 
Governments  Years  Allocations to 
agriculture plus and 
social services as a 
percentage of 
allocations to industry 
plus (BE) 
Allocations to 
agriculture plus as a 
percentage of 
allocations to industry 
plus (BE) 
  1990-91  26.8  14.6 
Congress end  1995-96  31.5  16.6 
UF end  1997-98  37.7  16.6 
NDA end   2003-04  44.5  12.6 
UPA end  2008-09  54.7 (63.9)  14.4 (25.4) 
UPA II  2009-10  60.9  23 
Note: The bracketed value is based on revised estimates 
Source: Calculated from the Economic Survey and Budget Documents, http://indiabudget.nic.in 
 
 
Column 3 Table 1 shows no government was able to accelerate promised expenditure, given 
budgetary constraints, except the UF—which had the worst record in keeping its promises. 
Column 4 shows the UPA would have had the greatest success in reducing the FD in its term, 
were it not for the crisis year which made it the worst performing government. The best was 
the NDA, which achieved this without the FRBM, in a period when real interest rates were 
high and growth rates low, there were a number of adverse shocks, and a large payout due to 
the award of the Fifth Pay Commission. 
 
In the next section we see how interest and growth rates affect the evolution of government 
debt and deficits. 
 
Deficits and the evolution of Government debt 
A higher real interest rate means higher interest payment on past debt. This adds to 
expenditures and therefore deficits. Higher growth, apart from contributing more revenues, 
also increases the denominator, thus reducing debt and deficit ratios.  
 
In order to explore this formally we need to make the conceptual distinctions between 
different kinds of deficits. The fiscal deficit (FD), used in Table 1, gives the government‘s 
borrowing requirement in any year to finance current and capital expenditure net of tax and 
non-tax revenue. The revenue deficit (RD), or deficit on current account, is the amount the 
government needs to borrow to finance its own consumption. The primary deficit (PD) is the 
FD minus interest payments. Since this is net of the burden of servicing of debts due to past   7 
borrowing it is a measure of current borrowing, and of fresh addition to government debt. 
This, along with interest payments, adds to government debt.   
 
If real government purchases are Gt, nominal net tax collections are Tt, Pt is the price level, 
and it is the nominal interest rate then the nominal value of public debt, Dt, increases in any 
year by nominal interest payments on past debt plus the PD, PtGt - Tt.: 
 
t t t t t t T G P D i D 1 1 1                (1) 
 
If real public debt is t t t t P D i B 1 , the real debt to output ratio is bt, real tax collections 
to output ratio is t t P T , substituting for Bt in (1) and dividing by output Yt, gives: 
















P B 1 1
1
               (2) 
 
Transformations of (2) using  1 1 1 , 1 t t t t t t P P Y Y g  for growth and inflation 
respectively, and the approximation  t t t t t t g i g i 1 1 1 1 , gives the 
change in the real debt ratio:  
 
      t
t
t
t t t t t t Y
G
b g i b b 1 1                (3) 
 
Equation (3) shows a high growth rate can be a strong force for reducing the debt ratio. To 
the extent the tax ratio rises with growth
3, the impact increases. The real debt ratio rises with 
a high real interest rate,  t t t i r , and the PD ratio (pd). It rises with itself if the real 
interest rate exceeds the growth rate, and in such conditions, high debt levels can imply 
exploding unsustainable debt. If the real interest rate equals the rate of growth, the pd alone 
would add to the debt ratio. A growth rate that exceeds the real interest rate would reduce 
debt. 
 
The  equation  gives  another  way  to  assess  the  performance  of  different  governments,  by 
comparing  pd  estimated  from  equation  (3)  with  the  reported  pd.  Government  interest 
                                                            
3 The ratio of Indian tax revenue to GDP, which had long stagnated in single digits, peaked at 12.6 in 2007-08 
with high growth, before falling in the next crisis year to 11.8.   8 
payments, iD, and debt D are reported in the budget documents. From these two an estimate 
of the nominal interest rate paid on government debt can be obtained. Subtracting inflation 
calculated from the GDP deflator gives an estimate of r. The growth of real GDP at market 
prices gives g. Then an estimate of pd is obtained by subtracting the first term on the RHS of 
equation  (3)  from  the  change  in  the  debt  ratio.  These  calculated  pd  series  are  graphed, 
together  with  the  pd  reported  in  government  budget  documents,  and  horizontal  lines 
indicating the periods different post-reform governments were in power, in Figure 1.  




























































A calculated pd higher than the historical pd implies that given the reduction in debt due to 
high growth and low r, for the historical change in debt to have occurred, the pd must have 
been higher. It indicates possible misreporting of the primary deficit, or that debt ratios were 
not reduced as much as they could have been, given the favourable conditions of high growth 
and low real interest rates.  
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The largest gaps between the two pd series indeed occurred when growth was high; they were 
also periods when Mr. Chidambaram was the finance minister, first in the UF and then in the 
UPA government. Figure 2 shows the high growth periods and that historical pd indeed fell in 
those periods. It also shows the adverse effect of high r on government finances.  
 
During the years of the NDA government inflation fell, but nominal interest rates continued 
to be high, so that high real interest rates tended to raise debt. Since growth was also low, r-g 
was high. The implicit r facing the government was negative earlier, became positive in 
1996-97,  peaked  at  5  percent  and  fell  below  1  percent  only  in  2004-05.  The  NDA 
government had to pay paying the highest real interests rate on debt in the post-reform period. 
But during the UPA years, nominal interest rates also fell, and inflation began to rise again, 
driving real interest rates very low. Growth peaked at average rates of above 8 percent, and 
the FRBM Act was also passed in this period. The pd fell along with the mandated fall in FD 
and RD. It turned into a surplus for the first time in 2004-05. Tax revenue was buoyant. But 
the fall in debt was not as much as these favourable conditions warranted, explaining the very 
large gap between the calculated and reported pd. Despite the FRBM, actual deficits were 
probably  higher  than  reported  deficits.  The  growth  dividend  was  blown  up  in  large 
expenditures. The pd it shot up in the year of the global financial crisis, and is estimated to be 
3 percent in 2009-10. Items left uncovered helped create the explosion despite modest tax 
cuts in the fiscal stimulus packages. 
   
In the steady state, when b and other variables are constant, equation (3) reduces to b = pd/g-
r. For the debt ratio
4 to stay unchanged at around 0.8, at the current pd, the growth rate must 
exceed the real interest rate by 3.75 basis points. At current rates b will increase. With pd = 3, 
r = 4, g = 7, the steady-state value of b is 100 percent. Unless growth revives and the pd is 
reduced India‘s steady-state debt is much higher than current levels. For example, with 
favourable values of pd =0.3, r = 6, g = 8, b reduces to 15 percent. If the reverse happens debt 
can explode, so a steady state will not be attained without a crisis.  
 
Even high growth together with the FRBM was insufficient to reduce India‘s debt enough to 
build robust space for countercyclical fiscal measures. The goal of inclusive growth 
encouraged large government expenditures, as tax revenues rose with growth. Goyal (2009) 
                                                            
4 Indian Central and State Government debt was 0.73 of GDP in March 2009.    10 
shows in a model of optimal monetary-fiscal policy that the deviation of government debt in 
a populous low per capita income emerging market in response to a consumption shock rises 
with growth, tax response, and the level of debt. Therefore improved incentives for 
expenditure management are required. These changes are necessary to prevent growth from 
petering out and hurting the ability to finance inclusion.   
 
Maintaining growth to make inclusion possible    
Although growth does very effectively reduce government debt and deficit ratios, there is 
also a temptation to expand spending. This vitiates the possibility of countercyclical fiscal 
policy, and taken to extremes can make debt explode. If government demand is to expand in 
crisis  times  such  as  2008-09  where  there  were  severe  negative  shocks  to  export,  private 
consumption and investment, then it must contract when private demand is booming to create 
the fiscal space for countercyclical intervention. Growth does tend to decrease debt ratios but 
not if there is a permanent rise in government expenditure greater than the increase in tax 
revenue. 
 
A  distinction  can  be  made  between  structural  and  cyclical  deficits.  The  cyclical  deficit 
depends on the stage of the cycle. A structural deficit may arise if trend expenditure exceeds 
revenues. It may be defended in a transitional high growth period, since growth reduces debt 
ratios, but expenditure financed by such a deficit must be such as creates supply-side capacity 
that enables growth. 
 
The reform period has seen successful tax reform, and tax buoyancy. The implementation of 
GST will take this further. The move towards uniform low rates that encourage compliance, 
increase the tax base, and reduce transactions cost is in the right direction. The per capita tax 
burden must not increase.   
 
But despite voluminous reports from the expenditure reform commission, there has been no 
equivalent reform on the expenditure side. Reform based on just four principles can make a 
difference. 
 
First, the share of growth enhancing expenditure must be increased, since we have seen the 
beneficial effects of growth on government‘s finances. The capital expenditure in the budget 
has fallen as low as 2 percent of GDP. Neglect of energy and irrigation continued in the UPA.   11 
Even so, physical capital alone does not contribute to growth. Anything that builds human 
capacity does so. Thus capital should be redefined to include human, social and physical 
capital.  For  example,  inclusion  reduces  communal  and  identity  politics  and  encourages 
people to turn their attention to productive activities. Efforts should be made to target welfare 
payments to infrastructure, education, and human capital formation. Increasing capacity and 
assets of the poor is the sustainable way to lower poverty. Government expenditure should be 
reclassified as that which has a long-term impact and pure consumption expenditure, and the 
share  of  the  former  increased.  Thus  there  must  be  a  change  in  composition  towards 
expenditure that improves the nation‘s supply response.  
 
Second, whatever is spent should be spent well. Expenditure should be made with maximum 
effectiveness and impact. Expenditure reforms including better accounting and management 
information systems are required to reduce waste, leakages, and delays. The crisis showed 
what government machinery is capable of as large amounts were effectively spent in a short 
period, and expenditure targets exceeded for the first time. Such focused spending can be 
made the rule rather than the exception, through serious deadlines and better system design. 
Outcomes must be assessed, responsibility and rewards assigned, and expenditure reallocated 
to where it has maximum impact. 
  
Third,  where  transfers  have  to  be  made,  they  must  be  better  targeted,  and  implemented 
without creating distortions and arbitrage. This step alone will cut out the major source of 
leakages  and  corruption.  Rather  than  distorted  prices,  that  create  a  black  economy  and 
weaken the supply response, direct income transfers should be given where necessary to the 
aged and disabled, using new technology like the proposed unique identification numbers. 
Food security could also be designed as a direct income transfer to the woman of a BPL 
household. Research shows this makes it more probable that the money is used for food.  
 
Fourth, any permanent rise in government consumption or transfers should be linked to a 
specific  tax  resource.  This  will  impose  the  necessary  discipline  on  the  tendency  to  keep 
starting new schemes that ultimately end up increasing the deficit. It will make the cost of a 
scheme clear to the politician and the electorate and reduce the politician‘s ability to impose 
indirect burdens that take away with one hand what he gives with the other. 
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To be effective the above principles must be enshrined in systems and in legislation. The 
FRBM Act was an attempt to impose fiscal discipline, but the requirements were met largely 
through decreasing government capital expenditure. Other creative means such as off balance 
sheet items were found to maintain the letter of the law even while violating its spirit. And 
this in a period when there was tremendous growth and tax buoyancy. Even while using up 
all these extra resources, in the final year, Chidambaram just left items like loan waivers 
uncovered, explaining the sharp jump in deficits when growth faltered. The Act leaves the 
government the ability to legislate itself out of commitments made.  
 
In the US similarly creative accounting defeated the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Bill that 
set yearly ceilings for the deficit. The design flaws shown up by experience were corrected in 
the  Budget  Enforcement  Act  of  1990,  and  genuine  improvement  in  government  finances 
followed.  
 
Among the better incentive features were expenditure caps that enforced small reductions in 
discretionary spending.  New transfer payments to individuals could be made only if these 
transfers were demonstrated to have assured funding. Unlike deficit targets, expenditure caps 
allow automatic macro-stabilization, since deficits can increase, in a recession, as revenues 
fall.  The  temptation  to  increase  spending  in  a  boom  is  moderated.  Escape  clauses  were 
provided for emergencies even in the caps. Since this flexibility reduced pressures to violate 
the Act, it increased its credibility. In the Indian context, detailed expenditure targets are 
required for individual ministries, and levels of government, as part of improved accounting, 
planning, and expenditure management. Even if the FRBM cannot be re-enacted the above 
should form part of systematic strengthening. 
 
A more credible FRBM or better systems will allow better fiscal-monetary coordination. In 
post-reform India, as the RBI gained greater independence, monetary tightening sought to 
compensate  for  fiscal  giveaways,  harming  growth.  Or  it  could  be  the  government  itself 
forcing monetary tightening given the electorate‘s sensitivity to high inflation. Even though 
reducing demand is an inefficient and costly way to fight cost-push inflation. Growth was 
stimulated only when Indian interest rates fell after 2000, despite high government deficits, 
and aggressive sterilization, because international interest rates fell. 
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In the post-crisis circumstances, the global push for demand stimuli has made a coordinated 
monetary-fiscal response possible despite high government debt. Everyone doing it made it 
possible for us to do what the economy needed. Global markets‘ initial doubts about high 
FDs  gave  way  before  attractive  growth  rates,  the  second  highest  in  the  world.  Inflows 
resumed, as they factored in that growth makes government debt sustainable. There are fears 
that high government borrowing will raise interest rates, but since much of the borrowing is 
being completed in the slack period when private demand is low, the RBI is committed to 
support the borrowing with quantitative easing through OMOs, and since a lower level of 
inflows means government balances sequestered for sterilization can be released, the higher 
borrowing can be smoothly handled. The absolute figures may high at five lakh crores, but 
then the size of GDP, savings and markets has all expanded. 
 
If the composition of fiscal expenditure changes, longer-term monetary policies can also be 
recast to support growth, and further boost the diversified sources that sustain Indian growth. 
These  include  high  domestic  demand  and  savings,  agriculture,  openness,  technology,  the 
demographic  profile,  the  infrastructure  cycle,  improvements  in  markets  and  institutions, 
stable democracy, and having crossed a critical threshold. As a net commodity importer India 
gains from lower global prices. Dependence on external demand is low compared to other 
Asian countries. So is the dependence on foreign capital. The limited inflows required to 
remove sectoral intermediation constraints in the domestic financial sector, have revived. 
India‘s  higher  growth  in  its  transitional  catch-up  phase  does  offer  valuable  degrees  of 
freedom to Indian macroeconomic policy. But it requires some discipline to safely harvest it. 
 
The steady increase in the quality of Indian institutions essential for sustainable development 
has occurred. It is possible this will continue, and even lead to a steady improvement in 
governance.  Just  as  the  late  90s  slowdown  was  the  critical  period  when  Indian  industry 
restructured and transformed itself, we may look back on the global crisis as the watershed 
when  the  Indian  government  transformed  itself  and  showed  it  also  could  deliver.  Some 
systemic improvements in expenditure management are, however, a prerequisite. 
 
 
   14 
References 
Goyal A, 2004, ‗Promises and Performance in Indian Budgets‘, Economic and Political 
Weekly, July, 39(30), pp. 3336-3340 
 
Goyal A, 2009, ‗Sustainable Debt and Deficits in Emerging Markets‘, presented at 
Quantitative Approaches to Public Policy – Conference in Honour of Professor T. Krishna 
Kumar, IIMB Bangalore, available at http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/PP-062-28.pdf. 
 